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The Appellant

(“Treasurer”),

by and through her attorneys of

Roden Crockett Hansen

&

respectfully submits this

Reply Brief in support 0f her Appeal.

record,

Hopkins

Hoopes, PLLC, appeals from the decision 0f the District Court, and

ARGUMENT
Idaho Code Section 67-1602 (the “Statute”)

of reference,

it

lies at the heart

0f this case. For ease

provides:

IDAHO STATE CAPITOL — ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF SPACE.

The

space within the interior of the capitol building shall be allocated and controlled
as follows:

The interior Within the rotunda, the hallways 0n the ﬁrst and
second ﬂoors, the restrooms located adj acent thereto, the elevators, the stairways
between the ﬁrst, second, third and fourth ﬂoors (excepting the interior stairways
between the third and fourth ﬂoors within the legislative chambers), shall be
space within the capitol building open t0 the public (“public space”). Subject to
this chapter, the director of the department of administration shall maintain all
(1) Public space.

public space.

(2)

Executive department. The governor shall determine the use and allocate the

space Within the second ﬂoor. The director of the department of administration
shall maintain

such space.

The legislative department shall determine the use of
and fourth ﬂoors as well as the basement, Which
basement shall include the underground atrium wings. A11 space Within the ﬁrst,
third and fourth ﬂoors and the basement shall be allocated bV the presiding
ofﬁcers of the senate and house of representatives. The presiding ofﬁcers shall
maintain such space and provide equipment and furniture thereto, provided
however, that the presiding ofﬁcers may contract with the director of the
department 0f administration to maintain such space and provide equipment and
(3) Legislative department.

the space

0n the

ﬁrst, third

furniture thereto.

LC.

§

67-1602 (emphasis added).
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As amended

1.

time, the Legislative

Department

in 2007, the Statute

t0 act t0

unambiguously requires, for the ﬁrst

“determine the use” 0f the ﬁrst ﬂoor of the

Capitol.

Respondents argue, and the District Court found, the Statute

and requires n0 further action by the Legislative Department
ﬂoor. Respondent’s Brief (“RB”), pp. 13-14. That

While the word control
in the introduction,

and there

is

is

is

Statute, as

of the ﬁrst

not the case.

not found in the body of the Statute

no question

“self effectuating,”

to determine the use

itself, it

does appear

0f certain parts 0f the

that the Statute assigns control

The 2007 amendment

Capitol t0 either the Executive or Legislative Departments 0f government.

0f the

is

quoted above, changed control of the ﬁrst ﬂoor 0f the Capitol from the

Executive Department t0 the Legislative Department. Being given control,
duty of the Legislative Department t0 determine the use of its

new

it

then became the

ﬂoor, and the duty 0f its

presiding ofﬁcers to allocate the space within the framework 0f use as prescribed

by

the

Legislative Department.

This was something unprecedented, created out 0f a compromise between the

Governor and the then presiding ofﬁcers

to facilitate renovation

of the Capitol building, and

brought existing uses 0f the ﬁrst ﬂoor by the Executive Department into conﬂict With the

it

new

control given to the Legislative Department. Recognizing this, the Governor, Legislative

Leadership and various members discussed and negotiated the
interests

could be

It

the ﬁrst

made

in

Which the conﬂicting

t0 live together.

was agreed

ﬂoor so long

way

that the Treasurer’s

as the Treasurer elected to
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ofﬁce could remain in

remain

there.

its

traditional place

on

Respondents have chosen

to ignore the history

the Legislative Department control 0f the ﬁrst

and documents Which
pp. 15224-1625.

detail those events

They would have

series

of events that has given

ﬂoor of the Capitol. They

have been

RB,

stricken.

the Court ignore that

amendment of LC. §67-1204 contemplating

and

assert that the afﬁdavits

on two occasions,

the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

They have

pp. 2-3.

i.e.,

the

not. Tr.

2007

would move back

t0 its space

on the ﬁrst ﬂoor once the renovation was complete, (2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 41,

§ 2),

and the approval and funding 0f the Capitol Commission’s plan for renovations providing for the
Treasurer’s ofﬁce t0 remain in

§§

1

and

2), the Legislative

least the southeast

its

traditional location,

(2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 157,

Department has determined a use 0f the Capitol’s ﬁrst ﬂoor, or

at

quadrant of it, where the Treasurer’s ofﬁces are located.

Respondents are contending that once control 0f the ﬁrst ﬂoor was given over

t0

the Legislative Department, Respondents could g0 forward With allocation 0f the space. Their

argument has the

effect

0f rendering the Legislative Department’s explicit statutory duty to

“determine the use” superﬂuous, Violating the rules 0f statutory interpretation. See, Nelson
Evans, 166 Idaho 815,

by

,

464 P.3d 301, 306 (2020). They

the Legislative Department

was required

also argue that if additional action

to determine the use, the Statute

would have

included words t0 that effect, like “t0 vote” before the words “shall determine the use.”
that is

What

legislatures d0, they vote as a

body

v.

But

t0 take action. Finally, they argue that the

Legislative Department has never been asked to determine the use 0f space

on the

3rd

and

4th

ﬂoors 0f the Capitol which have always been controlled by the Legislature, and refer t0 several

housekeeping examples of leadership’s allocation 0f space, such

room

or a lounge, repurposing a hearing

the Senate Pages.

RB,

room

for a conference

pp. 6-8,17. That allocation of space
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is

as:

creating space for a break

room and relocating

certainly

What the

a

room

for

Statute has in

mind. Those ﬂoors have been traditionally used for general legislative purposes and the job of
allocating space for those purposes

The matter before

on a day-by-day basis belongs

the Court

is

not

t0 the presiding ofﬁcers.

In this instance control 0f the ﬁrst

that.

ﬂoor

has been changed from the Executive Department t0 the Legislative Department. The southeast
corner 0f the ﬁrst ﬂoor

is

occupied by the Treasurer, a constitutional ofﬁcer of the State of Idaho

Who

has occupied that part 0f the ﬁrst ﬂoor since the Idaho State Capitol building came to be.

This

is

not “day-to-day” allocation 0f space as Respondents argue. See,

RB p.

Legislative Department has twice said the Treasurer’s ofﬁce should remain

thereby determining the use at least in part.

It

21.

The

on the ﬁrst ﬂoor,

has never prescribed otherwise.

The Treasurer’s opening Brief discussed

at

some length

the

meaning of the

operative words 0f the statute and their distinct differences. Appellant’s Brief (“AB”), pp. 12-16.

The

Statute gave control of the ﬁrst

having been granted,
control

it

by determining

ﬂoor of the Capitol

t0 the Legislative

Department. Control

then became the duty 0f the Legislative Department t0 exercise that
the use to

which the ﬁrst ﬂoor would be put and then delegating the

presiding ofﬁcers t0 allocate 0n a day-by-day basis the space Within the uses as prescribed.

Determining the use

is

a function of control. The importance of determining the use of an entire

ﬂoor 0f the Capitol, twenty-ﬁve percent 0f Which has

historically

been occupied by the

Treasurer, a constitutional ofﬁcer of the State 0f Idaho, should not be delegated t0

0f the Legislature, and the Statute does not intend that

Respondents have also chosen

it

two members

be done that way.

t0 ignore that

on four occasions

in 2019, the

Legislative Department considered four appropriation bills to fund removal of the ofﬁce of the

State Treasurer

from

its

historic space in the Capitol. A11 four attempts failed. R. pp. 94-95, 97-

105.
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Judge Baskin did a thorough job of dealing with the
presented t0 her 0n the

trial

court level, but in the end, she just got

correctly, that the Legislative

control the ﬁrst

it

wrong. She declared,

ﬂoor of the Capitol. But she incorrectly conﬂated the

terms.

AB,

The

p. 15.

right to determine the use, but

Legislative Department

issues this case

Department has the sole authority under LC.

right to “determine the use.” “Control”

synonymous

many

§

67-1602(3) to

right to “control” with the

and “determine the use” are not equivalent or

right t0 control granted t0 the Legislative

Department the

Judge Baskin mistakenly declared that n0 further action 0f the

was necessary

t0 determine the use, thereby rendering

superﬂuous that

requirement so clearly expressed in LC. §67—1602(3). The Judge would grant the two members

0f Legislative Leadership, the Respondents in
Treasurer’s ofﬁce from

its

traditional place

this case, the right,

without more, to oust the

on the Capitol’s ﬁrst ﬂoor. That conclusion must be

reversed.

The Governor’s agreement with the presiding ofﬁcers

2.

relevant, admissible

0n

this issue,

the “deal” and the related negotiations

RB,

p.

22-23. That

In fact,

2007

is

and signiﬁcant.

In their argument

“uncertain.”

in

all

is

Respondents ﬁrst mischaracterize the history 0f

between the Governor and the then presiding ofﬁcers as

not the case.

three principals to the “deal,”

Governor

Otter, Senate

Pro

and House Speaker Denny, have expressly conﬁrmed the existence 0f the “deal”
afﬁdavits ﬁled in this case. R., pp. 257, 264—65, 270—71.
overall negotiations that occurred

between them

109—35, 257—58, 263—66, 270—71, 337—38.
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is

Tem Geddes

in their

Other evidence of the “deal” and the

abundant in the record. R., pp. 83—84, 86—88,

Respondents next assert that the “deal”

and therefore

irrelevant.

ﬁrst place, and if there

Capitol,

which

is

is

RB,

it

unrelated to “the alleged ambiguity”

But the Treasurer does not allege an ambiguity

pp. 23-24.

one,

is

in the

and duration 0f the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

relates to the place

in the

precisely the subj ect of the “deal” in question, and therefore highly relevant.

In concluding their argument discounting the signiﬁcance of negotiations between

the

Governor and Legislative Leadership having

d0 With location 0f the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

t0

at a

time preceding passage 0f H. B. 218, Respondents argue that had the Legislature intended that
the Treasurer’s ofﬁce

Statute t0 say so.

RB,

was

to

remain 0n the Capitol’s ﬁrst ﬂoor,

went

t0 the

it

could have amended the

pp. 25-26. Likewise, the Legislature could have acted to

Statute to provide that the Treasurer’s ofﬁce could

so then, and

it

amend the

n0 longer occupy the ﬁrst ﬂoor.

It

did not do

has not done so t0 date. At the time H. B. 218 passed both legislative houses and

Governor’s desk, the Legislature had passed the amendment t0 LC. § 67-1204

contemplating that the Treasurer would return to the Capitol once renovation was complete. R.,
p.

248; 2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 41, §

Commission’s Plan

for renovation

2.

had also approved and funded the Capitol

Which expressly included the Treasurer’s ofﬁce 0n the ﬁrst

ﬂoor. 2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 157, §§

had n0 reason

It

1

and

2.

The Legislature had acted

twice, and

t0 act further.

3.

Respondents’ argument that the 2007 amendment 0f the vault statute

has n0 bearing 0n this case

is

unpersuasive.

Respondents attempt
“vault statute,” as they call

it,

t0 discount the signiﬁcance

arguing

it

of the 2007 amendment of the

has “no bearing” 0n the interpretation 0f the Statute, and

only “addressed the location 0f the moneys, not the location 0f the Treasurer’s office.” RB, pp.
26-28. Respectﬁllly, that

is

not the case.
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Respondents would have the Court ignore the long historical

ties

between the

As

Treasurer’s ofﬁce, the vault in the Capitol and the monies in the Treasurer’s custody.

discussed in the Treasurer’s opening brief, they have been located together on the ﬁrst ﬂoor since
the ﬁrst original phase 0f the Capitol

actually rolled

down

State Street

was

built in 1905.

from the former

AB,

p. 3.

capitol building

The old manganese
and

Treasurer’s ofﬁce in

new

Capitol building before the outside wall

The

original vault statute

was

also enacted that

year, 1905. See,

was

slid into place inside the

new

same

safe

was even completed.
LC.

§

67-1204

Id.

(legislative

history).

As amended

in 2007, the statute also

documents the close association between the

Treasurer’s ofﬁce and vault, (and monies kept therein). Subsection

moneys
that

in the custody

of the

state treasurer

shall

1

required that: “1) A11 state

be kept in the vault and safe as provided for

purpose in the capitol building and in n0 other place.” 2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter

41, § 2 (subsection

1

0f 67-1204) (emphasis added). Then Subsection 2 of the

statute provided:

During the capitol building renovation, beginning in ﬁscal year 2007, or during
same moneys as set forth above, shall be kept in_a
vault within the ofﬁce of the state treasurer’s temporary location. Upon completion 0f
this renovation, the provisions 0f subsection ( 1) shall apply.
(2)

relocation due t0 an emergency, these

2007 Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 41,
In other words, the

vault in the Capitol

Any

2 (subsection 2 0f 67-1204)(emphasis added).

monies

in the Treasurer’s custody

by law temporarily followed

the renovation, then returned With

complete.

§

him t0

other reading 0f 2007

neither history nor logic.
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and kept

in the Treasurer’s

the Treasurer to his temporary location during

the vault in the Capitol after the renovation

amendment 0f the

statute is strained,

was

and supported by

Then Respondents

assert that in 2019, the Legislature again

When Treasurer’s ofﬁce was

so that

relocated, she

keeping moneys in the Capitol vault. RB,
In suggesting that the

location, the

Respondents attempt

p. 27.

2007 amendment

t0

the statute

would be relieved of the “inconvenience” 0f

location of the Treasurer’s ofﬁce, then suggesting the

its

amended

have

it

to the statute has nothing t0

do with the

2019 amendment has everything

to

do With

both ways. The 2007 amendment obviously

contemplated the location of the Treasurer’s ofﬁce as

it

temporarily

moved elsewhere

during the

renovation and then returned to ﬁrst ﬂoor of the Capitol after the renovation was complete,

where

it

has remained t0 the present day.

The

4.

District

Legislature “expressly delegated

Court ultimatelv held that
all

in passing the Statute, the

0f its power” to the presiding ofﬁcers, which

is

an

unconstitutional delegation 0f legislative power, an argument which the Court should

consider 0n appeal.

Respondents contend that the Treasurer cannot argue that the District Court’s
interpretation of the Statute causes an unconstitutional delegation 0f legislative

the argument

was not made below and cannot be

However, the

rule

raised for the ﬁrst time

of appellate review Respondents rely on

is

power because

on appeal. RB,

p. 28.

not as absolute as they suggest.

A party may reﬁne issues that they have raised below With additional legal
arguments so long as the substantive issue and the party’s position on that issue remain the same.

No. 47196,

Siercke

v.

Dist.

Brooke View, Ina, 162 Idaho 138, 142

v.

exists

Siercke,

between a reﬁned

See, State

v.

slip op. at 8 (Idaho,

n.2,

November 20,

2020);

395 P.3d 357, 361

issue, appropriate for review,

and a new

Ada Cmy. Highway

11.2

issue,

(2017).

unﬁt

for consideration.

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 98—99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1270—71 (2019).
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A distinction

Here, the “substantive issue” at stake

and the Treasurer’s position 0n

that issue

is

the proper interpretation 0f the Statute,

now

remains the same

as

it

was below,

i.e.,

the Statute,

properly interpreted, requires action by the Legislative Department to determine the use 0f the
ﬁrst ﬂoor.

The

fact that the District Court’s ultimate

0n summary judgment precipitated the additional
unconstitutional delegation 0f legislative

argument” that should be considered by

power

and incorrect interpretation of the Statute

legal

is

argument

just that

this Court.

—

that

its

interpretation causes an

a permissible “additional legal

Siercke,

No. 47196,

slip 0p. at 8.

Respondents also assert that the Treasurer’s delegation argument

fails in

any

event, primarily because there cannot be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority

within the Legislative Department. RB, pp. 29-30. Respondents also incorrectly assert that “the
prohibition against delegation 0f legislative authority

is,

at its core,

an issue involving separation

of powers among the three branches 0f Idaho’s government” and “to implicate the nondelegation doctrine, the delegation must be from the legislative branch t0 another, co-equal

branch of Idaho’s government, such as the Executive Department.”

Are we
legislative or

t0 believe the Legislature could constitutionally delegate

lawmaking power to

its

consider and vote t0 pass legislation?

t0

Or

for that matter, to

Instead, while separation of powers

is

its

entire

leadership, allowing the presiding ofﬁcers alone to

someone

be a co-equal branch of Idaho’s government? The answer

can be and often

Id.

among

is

else

who

does not happen

fortunately and emphatically no.

the co-equal branches 0f government

implicated in delegation issues, the core of the non-delegation doctrine

fact that the legislative

power 0f the

Representatives pursuant t0 Article
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state is

3, §

1

vested exclusively in the Senate and House 0f

0f the Constitution.

is

the

As Respondents

point out, the Employers Resource case also requires a

consideration of the “practical context 0f the problem t0 be remedied and the policy to be
served.” Employers Resource

736 (2020).

n0 doubt

It is

argument points

out,

and

Management

C0.

v.

Kealey, 166 Idaho 449,

practical for the leadership to supervise

such as for lounges or

could

practical,

is it

461 P.3d 731,

organizational rules as their

its

t0 allocate space for day-to-day purposes

conference rooms or a place for clerks t0 be. But

,

it

reasonably be

understood that two members of Legislative Department would be delegated the authority to
determine the use 0f the ﬁrst ﬂoor in a manner that deprives the Treasurer, a constitutional
ofﬁcer,

Who

has occupied the Capitol’s ﬁrst ﬂoor since

When the District Court ruled that the

its

earliest

Statute

is

times?

to the use t0

ﬂoor and the area currently occupied by the Treasurer speciﬁcally,

manner that

should not be.

self—effectuating, requiring

need for further determination by the Legislative Department as

unconstitutional

It

it

no

be made 0f the ﬁrst

interpreted the Statute in an

violates the non-delegation doctrine.

This case presents a political question Which this Court should not

5.

mIn their response to the Treasurer’s argument

Respondents repeatedly remind us that
3 1-36. Respectfully,

we can

is

was

said in

issue here

is

Whether

Marbury

v.

What the law

is.

RB,

pp.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

not the issue here, because in one form or another, that

what courts always do, they declare What the law

The

political question doctrine,

the Court’s duty to declare

agree With What

over two hundred years ago. But that
is

it is

0n the

is.

this case presents a political question that the

should refrain from deciding. Deciding that question

is itself

Court

a form 0f declaring what the law

Traditions that spring from the heart of our form of government and the roles the judiciary and
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is.

the other branches play in

it

have generated a long

line

of precedent establishing that a court

should sometimes refrain from “declaring What the law

means

requires 0r

What a

question

presented. That line of precedent

is

statute

is,”

what a

constitutional provision

in certain circumstances, including situations

is

no

less valid than the line that

where a political

ﬂows from

Marbury.
In Miles

v.

Idaho Power

C0.,

116Idah0 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989),

this

Court

noted that the political question issue, and justiciability issues in general, are more appropriately
considered under the doctrine 0f separation of powers in Idaho, Which
Article 2, §

1

of the Idaho Constitution. Miles, 116 Idaho

Respondents note in
constitutional

their brief, the doctrine is triggered

commitment assigns

at

speciﬁcally embraced in

639, 778 P.2d at 761.

when

(1) a textually

demonstrable

(citing, Miles,

116 Idaho

at

v.

State,

either triggering event outlined in Tucker.

RB,

162 Idaho 11, 29,

639-40, 778 P.2d at 761-2).

Respondents assert in their brief that the Treasurer’s argument

As

As

the matter t0 a particular branch 0f government; 0r (2) the

matter implicates another branch’s discretionary authority.” Tucker

394 P.3d 54, 72 (2017)

is

p. 34.

Not

fails to

implicate

true.

outlined in the Treasurer’s opening brief, textually demonstrable constitutional

commitments assign exclusive

roles t0 the

Governor and the Legislature with respect

t0 the

enactment of legislation, the Legislature through the passage of bills by the Senate and House of
Representatives, and the Governor through the veto power. Idaho Constitution, Art. 3 §
§ 10.
--

;

Art.

4

A necessary part of these constitutionally vested powers is the inherent -- and discretionary

ability

effect.

1

of the Governor and the Legislature to negotiate and perhaps agree on legislation and

Thus, both triggering events outlined in Tucker are present in this case, contrary to

Respondents’ assertion.
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its

The dual
case

more analogous

which held

constitutional roles of the

t0 Troutner

v.

that a political question

Respondents rely upon in which

it

Governor and the Legislature here make

this

Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006),

was

was

presented, than

it is

to

Miles and the other recent cases

not. In Troutner, the dual constitutional

powers of the

Governor’s power to nominate and the Senate’s power t0 conﬁrm nominees were involved.
Troutner, 142 Idaho at 393, 128 P.3d at 930. Here

legislation

and the Governor’s power

between themselves,

The

to veto,

it is

the Legislature’s

power to pass

coupled with the necessary power t0 negotiate

that gives rise t0 the doctrine.

Legislature, through

its

presiding ofﬁcers and the Governor reached a

comprehensive agreement regarding the renovation of the Capitol which included a documented
agreement t0 leave the Treasurer’s ofﬁce Where
until

it

has been since the Capitol was originally

built,

such time as a Treasurer might choose t0 leave, as outlined in detail in the Treasurer’s

opening

brief.

This agreement

is

amply demonstrated

in the record before this Court. R., pp.

83—84, 86—88,109—35, 257—58, 263—66, 270—71,337—38.
This case presents a political question, and the Court should decline to entertain

Respondents do not have standing

6.

it.

t0 bring this action.

Respondents assert they have standing because the Statute grants them authority
to allocate the space

on the ﬁrst ﬂoor of the Capitol and

therefore, their standing

is

“consistent

With” the standing granted t0 the entire Arizona Legislature in Arizona State Legislature

v.

Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787 (2015). RB, pp. 36-39. Such

is

not the case.
In Arizona Legislature, the controlling issue involved an institutional injury to the

entire legislature

caused by the adoption of Proposition 106, by vote 0f the people, that created
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the Arizona Independent Redistricting

power to decide

Commission

legislative redistricting issues.

legislature sued the

AIRC

(the “‘AIRC”),

and deprived the

Arizona Legislature, 576 U.S.

in federal court seeking a declaration that the

at

AIRC

legislature

792, 802.

and

its

map

0f

The
for

congressional districts violated the “Elections Clause” 0f the U.S. Constitution. Arizona

The Court held

Legislature, 5 76 U.S. at 792.

Arizona Legislature, 576 U.S.

that the legislature

had standing

to pursue its claim.

at 803-4.

In doing so, the Court distinguished

its

prior decision in Raines

811 (1997), which held that six individual members 0f Congress did

n_0t

v.

Byrd, 521 U.S.

have standing

t0

challenge the Line Item Veto Act. Arizona Legislature, 576 U.S. at 801-2. Raines also involved

a claim of institutional injury (the diminution 0f legislative power). Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. In

Raines however, the Court found

it

important that the

members of Congress bringing

“have not been authorized t0 represent their respective Houses 0f Congress in
indeed both Houses actively oppose their
contrast, the

legislature

suit.” Raines,

521 U.S.

at

the suit

this action,

and

829 (emphasis added). In

Court distinguished Raines in the Arizona Legislature case on the basis that the

was ”an

institutional plaintiff asserting

an

institutional injury,

and

it

commenced this

action after authorizing votes in both 0f its chambersf. .]” Arizona Legislature, 576 U.S. at 802
.

(emphasis added).

The Raines case involved individual members of Congress claiming an
institutional injury

involved.

where the

By contrast,

institutional

body

suit

had not been authorized by Congress, the

institutional

body

the Arizona Legislature case involved the Arizona Legislature, the

itself,

asserting an institutional injury

Where the

authorized by votes in both houses. Given those circumstances,

suit

it is

had actually been

not surprising that the Court

found no standing in Raines. but found standing in Arizona Legislature.
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Here, Respondents concede the alleged injury at stake
allegedly suffered

by

the “Legislative Department,”

injury

0n behalf 0f the

0n the ﬁrst ﬂoor of the

entire Legislature,

institutional injury

the Legislature as a whole.

i.e.,

And they further contend they have been authorized to

an

is

RB,

p. 38.

seek judicial redress for that institutional

because the Statute provides they can allocate the space

Capitol.

Notwithstanding the fact that that they are authorized t0 allocate space under the
Statute, the Legislature has not authorized

institutional injury.

There

is

n0 evidence

them

to bring this suit

that the Legislature has

on

its

done

behalf for an admittedly

so.

This case

is

like

Raines, not Arizona Legislature, and Respondents lack standing to bring this action.

CONCLUSION
Should the Court agree that leadership lacks standing
political question is presented,

If not,

and

it

must be dismissed.

if plain

meaning

is

the lodestar of statutory interpretation, the Court

must ﬁnd

that I.C. § 67-1602(3) intends that the Legislative

use 0f the

new

can allocate

it.

space

It

it

t0 bring this action, 0r that a

was given

control of on the ﬁrst

Department must ﬁrst determine the

ﬂoor of the Capitol, before leadership

has done so twice: ﬁrst by amending the statute to provide a return of the

Treasurer’s ofﬁce t0 the ﬁrst ﬂoor once renovation 0f the Capitol

was complete, and a second

time by approving and funding the Capitol Commission’s plan for renovation that speciﬁcally

provided for the Treasurer’s ofﬁce continued presence on the ﬁrst ﬂoor.

The Court should conclude
that the use

still

of the ﬁrst ﬂoor

is

either that the Legislative

Department has determined

t0 include the Treasurer; or, that the Legislative

Department must

act t0 determine the use; in either case the District Court’s opinion giving that

leadership alone, must be reversed.
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power t0

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of December, 2020.
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